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Abstract 
This article examines the ethical and legal issues raised by the involuntary sterilisation of 
men with intellectual disability. It traces how, after the demise of eugenic reasoning, social 
policies of normalisation and care in the community provided new justifications for 
sterilisations. It examines how, ironically, modern arguments about promoting male sexual 
freedom have come to be used as a justification to sterilise.  Through examination of recent 
cases on the sterilisation of men with intellectual disabilities, this article explores the legal 
framework of the ‘best interests’ test and ‘least restrictive alternative’ provisions in the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 and argues that many sterilisations are unnecessary, 
disproportionate and not the least restrictive option. It also argues that the least restrictive 
alternative provisions contained in the 2005 Act need to be more rigorously applied.  
 
Introduction 
Involuntary sterilisation of people with intellectual disability raises a myriad of ethical and 
legal issues. This article assesses reported cases of sterilisation of men with intellectual 
disabilities heard in the English courts, namely the recent Court of Protection decision in An 
NHS Trust v DE
1
  and the Court of Appeal decision in Re A (Medical Treatment: Male 
Sterilisation).
2
 It argues that many sterilisations are unnecessary,
3
 disproportionate and not 
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necessarily the least restrictive option available. It will argue that the individual must be 
protected by the Court of Protection and that the court in DE, in giving primacy to the views 
of his parents and medical professionals, may have diluted the application of the best interests 
test by emphasising the interests of others, particularly the family. Furthermore, the 
application of the least restrictive alternative provisions contained in the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 were not rigorously applied and a preferable way forward is demonstrated by the recent 
case Re Local Authority v K and others
4
 where the least restrictive alternative provisions were 
more robustly implemented. 
The paper begins with a brief review of the proportion of male: female intellectually disabled 
sterilisation cases, and then sets out an outline of the historical response of the state to the 
sexuality of the intellectually disabled in the form of eugenic policy at the turn of the 20th 
century. It then describes how the ‘medical model’ gave way to a ‘social model’ conception 
of disability, and a greater awareness of rights of people with intellectual disabilities to enjoy 
intimate relations. The paper examines how, simultaneously with these developments, social 
policy included the devolvement of responsibility to the family under the guise of care in the 
community programmes. It traces how contemporary discussion has engaged in a rights-
based framework, described as a ‘paradigm shift’ heralded by the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The paper then examines the legal framework of 
the best interests test and the least restrictive alternative provisions and argues, using these 
case studies, how social policy past and present has shaped and influenced judicial reasoning 
to justify sterilisation. It will also argue that there is a need for specialist services in sex 
education, counselling and support for parents and to assist people with intellectual disability 
to cultivate and develop their unique sexual identity and sexual space as a more humane and 
ethical way. This article focuses on issues raised by the applications for orders to sterilise 
men with intellectual disabilities. 
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Measuring the prevalence of male sterilisations 
It is not possible to glean a comprehensive picture of numbers of sterilisations on men with 
intellectual disability from the literature, but the picture emerging from a combination of 
reported cases and research reveals that historically women have been disproportionately 
subjected to coerced and otherwise involuntary sterilisations.
5
  For example, research by 
Stansfield et al
6
 in the UK found that there were only three male sterilisation referrals out of a 
total of seventy three referrals to the Official Solicitor between 1988 and 1999.  In a follow-
up study by Roy there were five referrals with one authorisation, between 1999 and 2009, 
although it is not clear how many of these related to men.
7
 In the absence of empirical 
research it is not possible to estimate how many referrals are currently occurring in the UK.
8
 
In the international context historically more than 70, 000 people with an intellectual 
disability were sterilised in the United States after Buck v Bell (explained below).
9
 In Canada 
between 1927 and 1972 the Eugenics Board of Alberta authorised 2500 sterilisations, of 
which 40. 9% were on males and 59.1% were performed on females. Of those sterilisations 
that went ahead, 64.7% concerned females and 35.3% concerned males.
10
 Researchers in 
New Zealand and Australia comment on the lack of consistency in data and difficulties in 
obtaining the true extent of the number of applications.  In the New Zealand context, 
Hamilton comments that the lack of numbers itself points to a troubling problem and the 
extent to which the issue is ‘completely hidden’.11 In the most recent examination in 
Australia 2013, the Senate Community Affairs References Committee ('Senate Committee') 
on Involuntary or Coerced Sterilisation of People with Disabilities in Australia, commented 
on the lack of uniform data and practice in relation to vasectomies in young men, although 
they noted that Medicare data on vasectomies in males aged 15 to 24 point to 430 
vasectomies performed between 2003 and 2012 with an average of 44 a year.
12
Although it 
appears that there has been a decline in the use of sterilisation procedures both in the UK and 
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internationally, involuntary procedures on persons with intellectual disability continue to be 
used.
13
  
History 
Before turning to a more detailed account of the law it is worth exploring the contextual 
ethical and historical issues in which the issue of non-consensual sterilisation on people with 
intellectual disability is located. The question of basic and fundamental human rights was 
raised by Heilbron J in Re D,
14
 expressed as a right to procreate
15
 although contested by Lord 
Hailsham in Re B.
16
 These issues will not be explored in depth here.
17
 
Lord Hailsham stated expressly that his judgment was not based on eugenic or other public 
policy arguments in Re B. This statement was repeated recently by Mr Justice Cobb in Re 
DD.
18
 Why did the judges feel it necessary to make such a proclamation? The answer lies in 
history. At the turn of the century stereotypical ideas included the notion that intellectually 
disabled people had excessive sexual urges which they were unable to control.
19
 The spectre 
of eugenics looms large over this topic and explains much of the anxiety and unease of 
commentators and judiciary alike.
20
  
Eugenics is essentially about the altering of genetics through engineering,
21
 the basic idea 
being to eliminate certain traits from the gene pool.
22
 The eugenics movement was launched 
by Sir Francis Galton in 1904 and the term ‘survival of the fittest’ was advanced by Herbert 
Spencer who argued that the so called ‘unfit’ were reproducing at a greater rate.  People with 
intellectual disability were among these ‘unfit’23 and their continuing reproduction was 
thought to somehow undermine or dilute the intelligence of the population.
24
 They were in 
essence not fit to produce children. 
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Supporters of eugenics based theories saw them translated into government policy and action 
in several American states where sterilisation was practised freely on people with intellectual 
disability
25
 and was also adopted by some European countries.
26
 By 1937 thirty one states as 
well as Canada had enacted eugenic sterilisation laws enabling forced sterilisations to be 
carried out with the aim of protecting the gene pool.
 27
This policy was illustrated by the 
judiciary in a striking and often quoted passage by Justice Holmes in Buck v Bell 
28
 in 1927 
where the United States Supreme Court upheld the Virginia sterilisation law thereby 
legitimising the sterilisation of thousands of people.  
“We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best citizens for 
their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength of 
the State for their lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to 
prevent our society being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead 
of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind ... Three 
generations of imbeciles are enough.”29 
The history of sterilisation in England and Wales follows a different path with no compulsory 
sterilisation legislation enacted.
30
  There was a growth in institutionalising people with 
intellectual disability where sterilisations, in the absence of compulsory legislation, may have 
been performed.
31
 
The Ministry of Health set up the Brock Committee [1932-34] to consider the issue of 
sterilisation in England and Wales (in response to what King and Hansen assert was a belief 
about a growing populace of mentally disabled people) and attempted to bring the theoretical 
message into practice. They argue that while the Brock Committee realised the political 
difficulties in implementing these policies due to public hostility as well as opposition from 
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the Catholic Church, the Committee hoped that in time support may be raised. It was hoped 
this support would lead to a Royal Commission and eventually eugenics based legislation.
32
 
Eugenics theories enjoyed much support among British leading intellects and thinkers and 
this context could not be divorced from the Committee deliberations and recommendations.  
Eugenists formed the Eugenics Society (established in 1907), an organisation that 
campaigned for sterilisation, successfully lobbied the Brock Committee and even had 
representation on it.
33
  The backdrop of much of the discussion at this time was fear regarding 
degradation of the English race and the rising birth rate of the lower classes.
34
 The Committee 
opined that there were a quarter of a million people who potentially could be sterilised and 
these people were treated with some distaste. King and Hansen sum up the Committee’s 
beliefs about this section of people with intellectual disability: “[the committee] believed this 
group both personally unhappy and a source of malaise for the rest of society.”35 
By 1934 in the context of the political climate the Brock Committee opposed compulsory 
sterilisation but were in favour of voluntary sterilisation.
36
 Strangely, the Committee argued 
that people with intellectual disability had the ‘right’ to sterilisation.37  As to the question of 
how an incompetent patient may provide consent, Brock said: 
“the fact that many people are easily persuaded by those in whom they have confidence does 
not mean that they are really incapable of understanding the issues involved. I believe that 
high grade defectives are perfectly capable of understanding what sterilisation means, and I 
am confirmed in this view by letters I have seen from patients.”38 
In the event the conclusions did not lead to a Royal Commission or any further activity 
because of the horror stories emerging from Nazi Germany at that time where a large number 
of compulsory sterilisations were carried out. These events in effect torpedoed the support for 
any form of compulsory sterilisation and the report was forgotten about.
39
 A growing 
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movement opposed eugenics in the 1920s and 1930s and the popularity of eugenic 
sterilisations waned considerably.  
Social policy 
More recently with eugenic considerations in retreat, sterilisation justifications have taken on 
more social and medical dimensions (such as menstrual management)
40
 and with the advent 
of social policy of care in the community and deinstitutionalisation the nature of the 
justifications changed. The sexual needs and desires of people with intellectual disability 
were beginning to be recognised and a movement away from institutionalisation towards 
recognising their right to sexual expression began as trends towards normalisation which 
emerged in the last 30 or 40 years.
41
 Ladd-Taylor describes how normalization had a 
‘contradictory impact,’ in that while leading to the closure of institutions, it led to parents 
wanting sterilisations to prevent their daughters falling pregnant.
42
 
Jones and Marks argued that, ironically, supporters of sterilisation gained ground by arguing 
that people with intellectual disability could enjoy greater freedoms and independence in the 
community if the risk of pregnancy was removed.
43
  Certainly this argument was employed 
forcefully in DE as justification for his vasectomy (as shall be seen later).   
In the UK, community care policies have since been replaced with ‘supported living’ 
policies, including individualised support packages and support to develop ‘person-centred’ 
plans.
44
 The aim of this policy is to promote greater choice and control for people with 
intellectual disability.
45
 Tobin and Luke document how the historical medical model of 
disability which viewed disability as an abnormality that needed to be fixed or controlled 
moved towards an understanding that it was society’s failure to accommodate an individual’s 
impairment. They summarise the policy as shifting from eugenics, welfarism and, more 
recently, towards a rights-based approach.
46
 In respect of human rights, the entry into force of 
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the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in May 2008 represents a 
paradigm shift in the concept of disability, embedding the principles of non-discrimination, 
autonomy and inclusion. 47  The rights-based model assures respect for the inherent dignity of 
persons with disabilities and the promotion of their human rights and freedoms.
48
 More 
recently, and in line with this model, human rights groups describe forced sterilisation of 
persons with disabilities without consent as “a form of violence and torture, or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment”.49 
Parallel to this movement in social policy the financial costs of care programmes and the 
burden on the state came to be assessed. Lee and Morgan comment on the resource 
considerations and cost-cutting involved in the community care programme, and the 
consequent dangers of sterilisation for convenience.
50
  In some cases with responsibility 
falling onto the family under the welfare approach, Tobin and Luke assert that: 
“The animating principle of this welfare approach was the concept of best interests. More 
specifically, parents, in collaboration with medical professionals, invariably determined that 
it would be in the best interests of a girl or woman with an intellectual disability to have the 
burdens caused by her reproductive system removed by way of sterilisation. In practice, this 
principle often operated as a 'proxy’ for the interests of parents and other adults, and 
founded a vision of girls and women with intellectual disabilities as being necessarily 
incompetent and incapable of exercising any rights to reproductive autonomy.”51  
Ladd-Taylor describes the new social policy in the following way:  “In their [the critics’] 
view, substituted consent was simply another way by which coercive sterilization was made to 
look voluntary. Government control had become more sophisticated and appealing—and 
more subtle since the days when fear of ‘three generations of imbeciles’ justified compulsory 
sterilization”.52 Goldhar argues that the hidden agenda of reducing the economic burden 
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should not be used as a smokescreen to sterilise people with intellectual disability so that they 
will be ‘easier to handle’ by parents who understandably may feel they are overwhelmed with 
the burden of care. Doctors, Goldhar notes, have assisted parents with this quick way out of 
the potential dilemmas faced, and therefore neither parents or doctors can be trusted to make 
sound sterilisation decisions.
53
  
In a recent survey to investigate the attitudes of Australian doctors to sterilisation of men and 
women with intellectual disability, Gilmore and Malcolm found 23% of the sample endorsed 
sterilisation as a desirable practice for men and 41% for women.  The authors concluded “… 
doctors see less sexual freedom as desirable for adults with ID [intellectual disability]  
compared with those without ID, and they are more cautious about parenting than other 
aspects of sexuality. The number of doctors agreeing with sterilisation is disturbing”54 
Despite shifting social policy, it is interesting to observe how some vestiges of ‘medical 
model’ decision-making persist amongst the medical profession. Commenting on historical 
practices, Gilmore and Malcolm argue: “The endorsement of sterilisation when there is a risk 
that the disability could be passed on to a child could in part reflect what the Australian 
Disability Discrimination Commissioner believes is a eugenic undercurrent to the practice of 
sterilisation for individuals with ID…influenced by their medical training, and the medical 
model of disability in which disability is viewed as an impairment to be cured or 
prevented.”55 
These sentiments were also featured in submissions to the Australian Senate Committee: 
“Despite many submitters claiming that such thinking has 'moved on' significantly since the 
peak of the eugenic movement there was a pervading message from advocacy groups that 
some medical professionals and others in the community find it is very easy to have a kind of 
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either judicial or eugenic imperialism when it comes to making a decision about either the 
parents and carers or about the disabled young people or older people in question”56 
It is against this backdrop of evolving social policy that we now turn to consider the two 
reported cases on sterilisation on men with intellectual disabilities and assess whether the 
‘undercurrents’ discussed above are still evident in the application of contemporary medical 
and legal decision making. 
Background to DE and Re A 
On the 16th August 2013 the Court of Protection made declarations sought by the NHS 
Foundation Trust that DE, a 37 year old man, be given a vasectomy. The unusual feature of 
this case was the gender of the patient. This is the first case in which the courts have 
authorised a non-therapeutic sterilisation on a man who is not able to consent to the surgery.
57
 
Fourteen years earlier in another male sterilisation case to reach the courts, Re A (Medical 
Treatment: Male Sterilisation), the court of first instance and Court of Appeal had rejected 
the application for vasectomy of a man with Down’s Syndrome because, inter alia, the 
chances of A forming a sexual relationship were slim. 
DE was reported as having intellectual disabilities constituting an ‘impairment or disturbance 
of the functioning of his brain or mind’, with an IQ of 40 which ranked him as having an 
adult mental age of between 6 and 9 years.
58
 Living with and cared for by his parents, DE had 
achieved a certain level of independence in that he attended a day centre every day on his 
own and was involved in a relationship for more than 10 years with a woman with learning 
disabilities, PQ, who gave birth to their child in 2009. Although her disability was not as 
severe, nevertheless, PQ was unable to look after the child herself; the child was therefore 
cared for primarily by the maternal grandmother. 
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The application arose as a result of DE’s parents’ wish to have their son sterilised, arguing 
that it would allow him to regain his independence and that it was his wish not to have any 
more children. As he lacked the capacity to consent to the procedure, the matter came before 
the court in the form of an application by the NHS Trust for a declaration that he did not have 
capacity to consent and that it would be lawful in his best interests to undergo the 
procedure.
59
  
A, on the other hand, who was 28 years old when the case was reported had Down’s 
Syndrome and was assessed as being on the “borderline between significant and severe 
impairment of intelligence.”60 He was given a high level of care and supervision by his 
mother who brought an application to the High Court for a declaration that a vasectomy could 
lawfully be performed notwithstanding his inability to consent to it.  She was concerned that 
if her health deteriorated, and A was moved to local authority care, that he might have a 
sexual relationship resulting in pregnancy. The application was refused on the basis that 
while cared for by the mother it was unlikely that A would engage in a sexual relationship 
and even if a pregnancy were to occur, it would have a minimal effect on A. The Court of 
Appeal dismissed the appeal finding that, balancing all the factors, it was not in his best 
interests to undergo the procedure. Before we examine the legal aspects of these cases in 
more detail it is worth exploring the dangers of implying that the right and freedoms of 
people with intellectual disability to form intimate relations should be limited because of 
society’s unconscious fear of pregnancy as the outcome of the enjoyment of those rights. 
Right to intimate relations 
The rights of people with intellectual disability to enjoy intimate relations are well 
established in the literature and their sexuality was an integral part of normalization.
61
 People 
with intellectual disability have sexual needs and desires as well as the right to develop 
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intimate relationships.
62
  However despite the strides made and the clear statement in the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Gilmore and Malcolm point out that 
“systemic issues and attitudinal barriers remain.”63  
Shaw comments on how the sexuality of people with intellectual disability is a ‘socially 
constructed phenomenon’ and how although as a society we accept their rights to form sexual 
relationships that this acceptance comes at a price. That price is a prohibition on getting 
pregnant.
64
 This analysis can be applied in DE’s case where his relationship with his sexual 
partner flourished until she became pregnant.  Following the birth of the child the atmosphere 
in his home ‘became discordant and strained.’65 His parents’ distress quite clearly had an 
impact on DE and his daily activities were altered so that he could no longer spend time alone 
with PQ.
66
  He had also been prevented from meeting with her alone in accordance with a 
protection plan at an earlier stage of the proceedings which had caused him great distress. 
Their relationship was described as ‘enduring and loving.’67 When they had reconciled it was 
accepted that their relationship was an incredibly important feature in his life, King J 
commented, “Dr Milnes told the court that from DE's perspective this relationship is very 
important and must carry great weight in the balancing exercise to be carried out by the 
court.”68 At the conclusion of the hearing the King J said: 
“The relationship has been sexual in the past and DE (and PQ) would like to, and should be 
permitted, to resume their sexual relationship.”69 
Whilst the conclusion that DE has a right to continue and enjoy a sexual life like the non-
intellectual disabled is surely correct, arguably what this really amounts to is a statement by 
the court that he can continue to have a sexual relationship but only on certain terms - those 
terms including that he is sterilised. The danger here is that in granting  people with 
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intellectual disability a measure of conditional freedom, it reinforces the idea that they can 
enjoy sexual freedom but at a cost. 
The Law 
The cardinal rule is that medical procedures must be performed with the patient’s consent.70 
The absence of consent can expose a medical professional to civil or criminal liability for 
battery.
71
 Voluntary sterilisations performed following free and informed consent given by 
the person requesting it are not controversial. Given the irreversible nature of these 
procedures the presence or absence of consent assumes fundamental importance.  
Involuntary sterilisations are procedures performed on people with intellectual disabilities 
without their consent. The test of incapacity is set out under the Mental Capacity Act 2005
72
 
(‘MCA’) and court authorisation for a non therapeutic sterilisation is necessary as it is 
designated a ‘serious medical treatment.’73 The applicant should contact the Official Solicitor 
before the application is made.
74
  Sterilisation can only be lawful on those lacking capacity if 
it is judged to be in their best interests. 
In DE it was accepted by the court that DE had capacity to consent to a sexual relationship 
but lacked capacity to consent to contraception.
75
 The ‘best interests’ determination was 
central to both cases and we now examine the factors which influenced the court in arriving 
at their decisions. 
Best interests - individual views 
Involving the patient in the decision making process is clearly part of the legislative scheme. 
The best interest test is set out in section 4 MCA 2005: s4(4) states: the person making the 
determination must 'so far as reasonably practicable permit and encourage the person to 
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participate, or to improve his ability to participate, as fully as possible in any act done for him 
and any decision affecting him'.   
Further their viewpoints, beliefs and values are relevant to this determination:  s4(6) states the 
person making the determination must, 'so far as is reasonably ascertainable', consider: 
(a)  the person's past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant 
written statement made by her when she had capacity), 
(b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to influence his decision if she had 
capacity,
76
  
Clearly this model of decision making is intended to emphasise the patient’s views. In this 
regard, DE told the care professionals in meetings that he would rather use a condom than 
undergo a vasectomy. However, King J concluded that he lacked capacity to consent and 
furthermore that his views on the issue would be treated ‘with the utmost caution’77 which 
may be construed as meaning that they were treated with less weight. This begs the broader 
question: are the views of people with intellectual disability really taken into account and 
acted upon or are they merely being paid lip service?  
Involving the patient in decisions affecting their health and wellbeing will undoubtedly be 
beneficial to them (see discussion in Donnelly)
78
 as well as consistent with the ethical 
principle of obtaining consent to uphold principles of autonomy and self determination. 
Baroness Hale explained this in Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James: 
"The purpose of the best interests test is to consider matters from the patient's point of view. 
That is not to say that his wishes must prevail, any more than those of a fully capable patient 
must prevail. We cannot always have what we want. Nor will it always be possible to 
ascertain what an incapable patient's wishes are. ... But in so far as it is possible to ascertain 
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the patient's wishes and feelings, his beliefs and values or the things which were important to 
him, it is those which should be taken into account because they are a component in making 
the choice which is right for him as an individual human being."
79
 
Donnelly argues that a preference stated by the patient should be considered and actions 
inconsistent with this should be subjected to thorough scrutiny.
80
 In that regard the lesser 
weight apparently given to DE’s views is arguably contrary to the spirit of the MCA.  In Re 
S
81
 Marshall J commented that:  
“the statute now embodies the recognition that it is the basic right of any adult to be free to 
take and implement decisions affecting his own life and living, and that a person who lacks 
capacity should not be deprived of that right except in so far as is absolutely necessary in his 
best interests.”82 
Later in the judgment she adds: “That situation carries great weight and effectively gives rise 
to a presumption in favour of implementing those wishes, unless there is some potential 
sufficiently detrimental effect for P of doing so which outweighs this.”83  
It is illustrative that the sessions with DE wherein he had expressed a preference for condoms 
were dismissed by CH, the clinical psychologist, because he had, inter alia, “just had a 
session in which the issue of pain immediately following a vasectomy was discussed.”84 This 
is a very telling alarm bell. DE has a frank conversation where the drawbacks of the 
procedure are explained (i.e. the pain and discomfort) and he responds by saying he prefers 
condoms shortly afterwards. It is submitted that this is a response which is consistent with 
many of the general population and yet no-one would suggest that they be forced to undergo 
it. King J continues that “Dr Milnes’s final view is that if it is explained to DE that a 
vasectomy is foolproof in relation to ‘no more babies’, but that he might conceive with a 
condom ‘he would go for the vasectomy.’”85 The danger is that professionals project their 
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viewpoints onto people with intellectual disability or the views of people with intellectual 
disability disappear into the mist under the weight of ‘medical-speak’. It is arguable whether 
the presumption in favour of respecting the patient’s preferences, spoken of by Marshall J, 
should have been set aside by the weight of the other evidence in this case. 
There is another danger in the court’s approach in DE that medical professionals and courts 
may select patient’s views in ways that are consistent with their own.86 Researchers claim 
that courts may not grasp the subjective state of the incompetent patient.
87
 To quote Dresser: 
“they sometimes construct a mythical, generalized competent person to inhabit the body that 
lies before them.”88  She argues: “We should seek a more reciprocal relationship with these 
patients. Rather than making them the mirror of our own fears about debilitation and the end 
of life, we should attempt to ascertain their point of view, their perspective, on what is to be 
decided.”89 Although commentating about eliciting the patient’s view in relation to end of 
life treatments these sentiments surely can be applied in the sterilisation context.  
Donnelly argues that the ‘participation model’ adopted under the MCA is in line with article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in its protection of the right to family and 
privacy interests.
90
  The extent to which it is compatible with international proclamations in 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CIPD)
91
 will now be considered. 
Participation, inclusion and self-determination are at the heart of the paradigm shift 
articulated in Article 12 of the Convention. In affirming that persons with disabilities have 
legal capacity on an equal basis with others, Article 12(3) provides: “States shall take 
appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may 
require in exercising their legal capacity.”  
The essence of these provisions is that every person has the right to autonomous decision 
making and has the right to receive adequate support to make their decisions. This ‘paradigm 
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shift’ replaces substitute decision-making systems with a supported decision-making model 
that upholds the autonomy, wishes and preferences of the individuals concerned. Safeguards 
may be required to ensure that this support respects the rights and preferences of the person 
concerned, that there are no conflicts of interest or undue influence, and that the support is 
proportional and tailored to the circumstances.
92
 
In the most recent sterilisation case, Re DD, the Court of Protection gave scant regard to the 
CRPD in their decision, but it is clear that international calls for a clearer framework which 
places the rights of the intellectually disabled at the centre of their decision making with a 
system of supported decision making would ensure that DE’s wishes and preferences would 
be more clearly the focus.
93
 Since there are concerns in some quarters which view coerced 
sterilisation as an act of violence, the participation model needs to be reinforced. Given that 
people with intellectual disability may still be able to consent,
94
 it is submitted their consent 
or at least understanding should be present in the majority of procedures. The international 
framework of the CRPD has at its core that persons with disabilities should have equal access 
to voluntary sterilisation as well as other contraception which should be underpinned by full 
and informed consent. So the issue is not about the denial of these service to those who are 
able to freely consent or of not accepting the validity of this consent, once properly obtained, 
rather the danger is that we interfere with a person’s bodily integrity with a forced procedure 
undertaken solely on paternalistic principles when the life or serious health of the person is 
not at risk. 
As Goldhar argues people with intellectual disability are devalued which allows society to 
circumvent these individuals from the usual consent processes.
95
  
Best interests - interests of others 
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The MCA provides a framework for consulting carers and others as part of the best interest 
determination.  Section 4(7) provides: He must take into account, if it is practical and 
appropriate to consult them, the views of- ... 
(b) anyone engaged in caring for the person or interested in his welfare... as to what would be 
in the person's best interests... 
Before considering the case law it is illustrative to consider the motivation of parents for 
seeking sterilisation for their offspring. There may be anxiety about their intellectually 
disabled child’s sexuality; rooted in their ambivalent or restrictive attitudes about sex.96 There 
may be concerns about menstrual management, inappropriate sexual behaviour, risk of sexual 
abuse, and pregnancy 
97
 Stansfield et al report  “For the men, the referrals were prompted 
because of ‘transfer to adult care’, ‘latching on to pretty girls’ and a ‘long-term heterosexual 
relationship’...”98 They added: “We hypothesize that request for sterilisation may be driven 
by a combination of a fear of the risks associated with the person’s transition to adulthood, 
parental contraceptive attitudes, the requirement for a permanent solution to potential 
pregnancy and concern about who would care for any grandchild. “99   
Interestingly this is borne out by DE where the court accepted that DE was “significantly 
influenced by his parents.”100 The court set out what the consequences of another pregnancy 
for DE might have: 
“Not only would DE be upset, as he does not want another child, but so too would be his 
parents, which has a direct and significant impact on DE's well-being and happiness. The 
court is not directly concerned with the interests of FG and JK, but it is concerned at how 
their levels of tension and distress impact on DE's welfare and comfort and it is clear that the 
impact is considerable.”101 
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 “DE is very close to his parents; he loves and relies upon them. If they are upset he is upset. 
The court can take into account the benefits to FG and JK of DE having a vasectomy if it is a 
factor DE would consider if he had capacity. It is likely that DE would consider the benefit to 
his parents of relieving them of the anxiety and strain that they have been suffering and of 
which he has been very conscious.”102 
 “DE's parents were deeply distressed by PQ's pregnancy and the birth of XY. Although they 
are, JK says, 'getting through it', they have obviously been traumatised by all that has gone 
on since PQ's pregnancy was discovered in 2010. Those events remain raw and JK exhibited 
an almost tangible fear of the consequences of a second pregnancy. They know their anxiety 
has an impact upon DE, I am sure they do their best to protect DE from it but they are only 
human and inevitably DE is acutely aware of their distress; this has had a significant impact 
upon his own emotional comfort and well-being.”103 
We are also given glimpses of A’s mother’s reasons for the procedure in Thorpe LJ’s 
judgment where it was evident that she disapproved of sex outside marriage and would 
oppose a day centre which “adopted a permissive attitude to sexual intercourse.”104 
In respect of the case law, in Re F
105
 Lord Jauncey said, “in the case of a long term 
incompetent, convenience to those charged with his care should never be a justification for 
the decision to treat.”106 Surely this is the correct position to adopt. The waters on relatives’ 
interests had, however, been muddied prior to the MCA by a decision on bone marrow 
affecting an incompetent patient. In Re Y (Adult Patient) (Bone Marrow Transplant),
107
 a 
bone marrow donation was permitted from Y to her sister. Y, who was 25, was mentally and 
physically disabled. It is not immediately clear what the actual best interests of Y were served 
by the judgment as she would not stand to personally benefit. The court appeared to have 
taken a broader picture by promoting Y’s relationship with her mother and sister as the main 
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rationale and suggesting that her mother may not visit as often if her sister fell ill and so Y 
would indirectly benefit. 
In the sterilisation context, the courts have made clear in a series of cases that the interests of 
carers are not determinative; they can however “indirectly be a factor.”108  A feature in DE 
was the recognition of the “deep distress” suffered by his parents at the birth of his first child 
and their trauma was somehow a factor to consider, albeit indirectly, in the best interests 
examination. In any case, DE’s child resided with its maternal grandmother and she bore the 
brunt of the care burden. It perhaps would have been interesting to hear the views of PQ and 
her mother. One cannot dispute the love and devotion of DE’s parents and their utmost good 
will. However which parent of a non intellectually disabled child has not had sleepless nights 
about their child falling pregnant or indeed the deep distress or trauma a pregnancy would 
cause, yet who would countenance their children be sterilised to reduce their anxiety? 
In DE the court held that there were no missing ‘pieces of the evidential jigsaw.’109 His 
quality of life would improve as the supervision levels would be reduced, and for King J, 
“allowing DE to resume his long-term relationship with PQ and restoring to him his lost 
skills and independence” (such as swimming or boarding a bus on his own) were important 
factors in determining his best interests.
110
 Although this argument has much force and no-
one would seek to deny people with intellectual disability the process of integration and 
normalisation, another way of looking at this is that since the professionals
111
 and family 
revoked his independence following the birth of his first child, they agreed to grant it again 
on condition that he was sterilised.  In other words, one interpretation of this argument is that 
DE’s hard earned independence and skill development should be restored only on their terms.  
Interestingly the Court of Appeal in Re A was clear that wider societal concerns arising from 
potential pregnancy including the protection of vulnerable women were not relevant to the 
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determination the A’s best interests.112 A key factor was that A’s mother stated that she 
would not relax her supervision of A if a vasectomy were to be performed. Since he would 
not be free to enjoy a more relaxed regime, the balance was tipped against ordering the 
procedure. 
When considering viewpoints and motivations of parents and carers in this context, the 
‘ethics of care’ viewpoint provides an alternative to rights-based approaches. Herring argues 
the focus of legal and ethical responses should recognise interlocking mutually dependent 
relationships. He states: “To harm a caregiver is to harm the person cared-for; to harm the 
person-cared for is to harm the caregiver. There should be no talk of balancing the interests 
of the caregiver and the person cared-for, the question rather should be emphasising the 
responsibilities they owe to each other in the context of a mutually supporting 
relationship.”113  
This would represent a shift from an individualistic towards a relational paradigm.
114
 The 
promotion of close relationships may underlie individual interests and this idea certainly 
accords with the judicial trend in asserting that best interest not be confined to purely 
‘medical’ but to incorporate a ‘wide range of ethical, social, moral, emotional and welfare 
considerations,’115 which Herring argues could include ‘obligations towards others.’116 
It is possible that care ethics gives a balanced view to take account of carers’ interests as 
enhancing the individual’s interests, and certainly it was beyond dispute that both A and DE 
were very close to and well cared for by their parents. Indeed it would be true to suggest that 
their families were ‘at the centre of their interest.’117 
Care ethics may also provide a balance to the idea that the rights and interests of carers are 
“increasingly considered taboo.”118 As Tobin and Luke explain: “As recognised by the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, 'third parties have rightful interests' which must not be 
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overlooked in the quest to atone for past sins which saw the interests of women and children 
with disabilities serve as a proxy for the interest of their carers. Furthermore, human rights 
law actually anticipates that the rights of others, including a carer's rights to family life, 
assistance in the provision of care and indeed their own health, may legitimately be 
considered when assessing the justification of sterilisation in this context”119 
However, there are powerful counter-arguments in retaining the primacy of the individual’s 
interests over carers, most notably at the heart of coerced sterilisations is the violation of 
bodily integrity.
120
  Moreover it has been argued that care relationships are inherently an 
exercise of power, whether this power is exercised beneficially or otherwise, the aspect of 
force or coercion should not be overlooked.
121
 
While arguments in favour of an ‘ethics of care’ approach have some force, in the ultimate 
analysis major irreversible surgical interventions cannot be justified on an individual by 
coercion.  In uncompromising terms, the World Health Organisation announced in a recent 
interagency statement: “in making a decision for or against sterilization, an individual must 
not be induced by incentives or forced by anyone, regardless of whether that person is a 
spouse, parent, other family member, legal guardian, health-care provider or public 
officer.”122 
While giving primacy to carers’ views is objectionable, another approach which would serve 
a possible relational model, might be to distinguish parents/carers from long term partners. 
One of the striking features in DE was that he was in a long term relationship with PQ, whose 
views were never really considered. Perhaps meeting with DE and his long term partner, PQ, 
as a family unit, before the court hearing, was a better way forward on a model not miles 
apart from how a non-intellectually disabled couple would deal with their long term 
contraceptive needs. Such an enquiry arguably would be more in line with the objectives of 
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Article 12 of the CRPD, in supporting DE’s will, preferences and interests.  However, 
although this approach may well have worked here on these particular facts, it would not be 
appropriate in every case as coercion and undue influence could be hidden in long term 
relationships. For a couple planning reproductive choices outside the  intellectually disabled 
setting, the law is designed to safeguard against oppressive or forced sterilisation  through the 
legal framework of consent, although whether it does serve that purpose sufficiently is 
outside the parameters of this paper.
123
  
Promoting the least restrictive alternative 
In Re D Heilbron noted: “I cannot conceive of a more important step than that which was 
proposed in this case.” 124 These sentiments underlie the enormity of the procedure on 
individuals. Arguably the proposed procedure should be the ‘last resort’ as well as being 
proportionate.
125
 It is established that private life protected under the Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights includes choice about personal relationships with 
others and that sexual activity is "a most intimate aspect of private life."
126
 Any interference 
with privacy has to be proportionate to the legitimate aim.
127
 
It was accepted in court that having another child would be a distressing and traumatic 
experience for DE. It is also clear that a right to intimacy presupposes people with intellectual 
disability have equal rights to contraception, including sterilisation, as non-intellectually 
disabled do. The dilemma was powerfully summarised by the Australian Senate Committee 
who concluded: “An outright ban of non-therapeutic sterilisation procedures without consent 
potentially denies the rights of persons with disabilities to access all available medical 
support on an equal basis with persons without a disability. It is a 'one size fits all' solution to 
a complex problem. An outright ban removes the focus from the needs and interests of the 
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individual, placing it instead on generic notions of what is best for persons with disabilities 
as an homogenous group”128  
The question then arises of which method of contraception? 
The MCA provides that decisions made on behalf of those lacking capacity must be the least 
restrictive of an individual’s rights and freedoms .129 It stands to reason therefore that 
alternative procedures should be considered, such as contraceptives and/or sex education. 
Goldhar notes how some medical professionals have routinely ignored alternatives to 
sterilisation.  He argues that patients need to be allowed time to adjust to different options to 
see what may work or what may not.
130
 It could be argued that DE was not given such 
opportunity to continue training with condoms.  The court noted that he was learning how to 
use a condom, that ‘considerable progress’ had been made131 and that, in time, his ‘technique 
would improve with more training.’132 It is submitted that this course should have been 
continued particularly in view of DE’s opinion that he would prefer to use condoms as 
elicited by Dr Milnes and CH, a clinical psychologist.
133
 They both downplayed his views 
subsequently because, inter alia, CH suggested that he had “just had a session in which the 
issue of pain immediately following a vasectomy” had been discussed.134  
Dr Milnes took the view that if the condom user has “perfect technique and is very very 
careful,” the risk of a pregnancy over a 12- month period is 2%. However in relation to the 
“imperfect less than very very careful user” the incidence of pregnancy jumps to 18%.135  Dr 
Milnes conceded that “with regular clear instruction, DE would be as likely to use a condom 
as a person with capacity.”136 Arguably it was incumbent on the court to allow his training to 
continue. The principle of equal access would mean that DE should not have been treated less 
favourably than the general population. No one would countenance compulsory sterilisations 
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for non intellectually disabled people for imperfect condom use, so arguably sterilising 
people with intellectual disability is morally and ethically dubious. 
Lee and Morgan comment on how the House of Lords in Re B used facts to suit their view of 
how and whether the intellectually disabled person could cope with childbirth.
137
 In her 
discussion of Re F, Shaw similarly argues that judges ‘tend to elevate medical opinions to the 
status of facts’.138 It may be that the medical opinion was relied on too heavily to reach a 
decision on DE’s views and his feelings set aside too easily.  
Interestingly DE’s initial consultant urological surgeon at the NHS Trust was of the view that 
the procedure was not in his best interests
139
. This view was also shared by Dr Milnes, 
instructed by the Official Solicitor to provide an independent psychiatric report, who 
concluded in his first report that sterilisation was not in his best interests as there was “a not 
insignificant risk of long term chronic pain.”140 
The consultant “moderated” his view of the “long term post operative problems” (i.e. risk of 
chronic pain) at a subsequent hearing
141
 which led to Dr Milnes concluding that it was in 
DE’s best interests for a sterilisation to be carried out. A report from an independent 
consultant urologist commissioned by the Official Solicitor agreed with the revised opinion 
stating the “likelihood of severe scrotal pain…at less than 0.5%.”142  
In the medical literature, McCormack and Lapointe conclude in their research that the 
procedure is a safe method of contraception. However, they recognise that some patients feel 
long term pain, although they remark that this is ‘rare’.143 Selikowitz and Schned suggested 
the phrase “late post-vasectomy syndrome” to describe persistent long term pain.144 In their 
study, Myers et al state that the actual incidence of this syndrome has not been documented 
and note that reports range from 3-8%.
145
 Chen and Ball note that while the pain settles in the 
majority of patients, it “persists in a small number despite treatment,” and in severe cases 
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further surgery is necessary.
146
 In a survey of 172 patients who had undergone a vasectomy 
four years previously in Glasgow, McMahon et al found 33% had some pain, which 15% 
found troublesome and 9 patients (5%) had requested medical treatment for pain or swelling. 
They conclude that while a third of patients had some discomfort, a few patients developed 
severe pain which required further treatment. They argue that there is a need for informed 
consent about this risk of pain, uncommon though it might be.
147
 
Aside from medical effects, another question to consider is the long term psychological 
effects of having a sterilisation.  Research has shown that low self-esteem follows from 
sterilisation performed forced on people without their consent
148
 In one study it was found 
that forced sterilisation on people with intellectual disability, who lacked capacity, viewed the 
procedure as a ‘reduced or degraded status’ and this negative self image caused them to 
withdraw.
149
 The assumption that people with intellectual disability may not respond 
negatively to being sterilised is perhaps rooted in viewpoints that they are somehow inferior 
to the general population.
150
 This assumption has been discredited by researchers who 
demonstrate that people with intellectual disability have similar conceptions of sexuality and 
parenthood as non intellectually disabled people.
151
 These conceptions include the same 
‘uniqueness’ and that preference that the potential to develop fully should be made 
available.
152
 Arguably this development should include the opportunity to inhabit a space 
which allows freedom of action and choice in reproductive matters in line with the CRPD. 
A troubling picture can also be seen in research undertaken by Carlson, Taylor, & Wilson 
about the sterilisation of men with intellectual disabilities in Australia.
153
 They document one 
response from The Public Guardian of Western Australia: 
 “[they] outlined a number of anecdotal cases from the Public Guardian’s archives and 
commented on the lack of processes for facilitating informed decision-making. One young 
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man with Down syndrome was vasectomised to “protect against the possibility of getting a 
woman pregnant”. His family were unaware of the generally low fertility of men with Down 
syndrome. The young man involved was not aware of the operation or of its effect. In a 
second situation, a young man was told that unless he agreed to vasectomy, he could not 
marry his fiancé. He did not give informed consent and was apparently coerced into the 
sterilisation. He was reportedly disturbed by the outcome and needed months of 
counselling.”154  
They argue that for some men it may be difficult to explain the post surgical discomfort being 
experienced and how their behaviour may well be misunderstood as being difficult as a result 
of this discomfort.
155
 
Pregnancy and child birth can be a distressing experience and also cause psychological 
damage, so it is not advocated that anyone should be forced to have a child. The choice 
should not be ‘sterilisation’ or ‘no contraception’ presented in an all or nothing solution. 
Instead a genuine and real investigation into the least restrictive alternative and 
proportionality tests should ensure that other forms of non-surgical intervention are explored 
thoroughly for both sexual partners (just as would follow in a non intellectually disabled 
relationship) and then only if all else fails, or all is hopeless, should surgery be contemplated.
  
As there are reversible methods of sterilisation available then it follows from the least 
restrictive alternative principle that a reversible method is almost always to be preferred.  
The central question becomes are there any non-coercive processes available to achieve the 
same outcome once the decision to sterilise is made?
156
 Have all less restrictive measures 
been used and applied, especially non permanent? Underlying this discussion remains the 
central point that carers’ frustrations, time and anxieties regarding future pregnancies cannot 
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be used as reason to enforce an invasive non-therapeutic operation which carries significant 
physical and psychological risks.  In DE’s case, it boiled down to whether he could use the 
condom, or be taught to use it or indeed be entrusted to do so. It is not suggested his partner 
be required to use the morning after pill or have to undergo an abortion as this would be 
merely shifting the oppressive outcome onto women who already bear significant burdens of 
non consensual sterilisations in society.  
The arguments about not trusting or that people with intellectual disability may not be 
responsible enough to carry out this practice is again dehumanising people with intellectual 
disability and counter to the shifts in social policy.  In the final analysis this principle entails 
that the case-by-case individualised enquiry of each person with intellectual disability is 
continued and that the trajectory we have seen in A Local Authority v K (by the Official 
Solicitor) and others be welcomed as a reasoned way forward. 
In this case an application for sterilisation on a 21 year old woman with Down’s syndrome 
was refused by the Court of Protection. Cobb J held that there was a low risk of pregnancy, K 
was well supervised and that less invasive procedures ought to be tried. The court decided 
that sterilisation surgery would be disproportionate as there were less restrictive methods of 
contraception available.
157
 This is the key in that DE also had an alternative which needed to 
be fully exhausted. Justice Cobb concluded: “plainly risk management is better than invasive 
treatment, it is less restrictive. Moreover, I am persuaded by Dr. Rowlands that there are less 
restrictive methods of achieving the purpose of contraception than sterilisation, and that in 
the event of a need for contraception, these ought to be attempted.”158 
Cobb J also set out the process to be followed in applications for non-therapeutic 
sterilisations adding, “such a treatment decision is so serious that the Court has to make 
it.”159 This reminder makes clear the Court of Protection’s central role is in protecting people 
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with intellectual disability, and it is submitted they should enforce the least restrictive 
alternative provisions robustly.  
Moreover, unless there is clear evidence of a risk of sexual activity, it should never be 
countenanced as a ‘just in case’ measure. Is it right to carry out a surgical procedure which 
carries risks on a human being because of some possibility in the future?  
In DE the court noted in following Re A that  “any benefit of treatment has to be balanced 
and considered in the light of any additional suffering or detriment the treatment option 
would entail.”160  King J recognised that in applying the ‘balance sheet’ approach161 the risk 
of ‘long term scrotal pain and/or discomfort,’ its non-therapeutic nature and the fact that it did 
not protect against STIs,
162
 were factors to weigh into any balancing exercise. Adopting the 
approach set out by the Court of Appeal it is submitted that perhaps greater weight could 
have been assigned in DE to the risk of long term pain/and or discomfort which he may feel 
after surgery. 
Conclusion  
It does seem that after the demise of eugenic reasoning, social policies of normalisation and 
care in the community provided new justification for sterilisations. It is ironic that modern 
arguments about promoting the sexual freedom of men with intellectual disabilities should be 
used as a justification to sterilise them. The fact that A would not have enjoyed more freedom 
while DE was likely to do so was used to justify the sterilisation in the latter’s case.  
Deinstitutionalisation has also placed the burden of care onto parents who can only act within 
the context of their emotional and physical resources. Researchers have identified that there is 
a need for more specialist services in sex education and counselling for people with 
intellectual disability and their parents.
163
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Family interests and their concerns, although well intentioned and motivated by compassion 
and good will, should never be allowed to trump the interests of people with intellectual 
disability.  One does not wish to question the integrity of parents and their situation needs to 
be looked at sympathetically. However, it should always be questioned whether their 
decisions in this context are truly informed and whether access to counselling and support for 
alternatives might not be in order.
164
 
This trend is borne out by other studies cited above and suggests that it is incumbent upon the 
Court of Protection to enforce the ‘least restrictive alternative’ and proportionality 
mechanisms of the MCA robustly and that sterilisation should only be considered once all 
other avenues have been exhausted.  
It is suggested that further research on the long term medical effects of sterilisation on men 
with intellectual disability needs to be undertaken, particularly the psychological effects. In 
the medical sphere with the continuing development of long term contraceptive techniques 
like progestin implants, surgical methods may well be reduced but further research is 
necessary.
165
  
It is also clear that a genuine participation model of decision making be adopted in keeping 
with international standards by UK courts to ensure that the views, wishes and interests of 
people with intellectual disability are genuinely respected. The outcomes in these cases can 
never justify the oppressive means to achieve them unless the life or serious health of the 
individual is at stake and the surgery is a proportionate response. 
NOTES 
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